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Abstract
The notion of dark networks has recently received attention in the literature on policy
network analysis. Dark networks are defined as illegal and covert, in contrast to bright
networks which are legal and overt. In this article, we suggest a third category – grey
networks – which are characterised by their use of secrecy and concealment despite their
ostensibly legal status. These networks are subject to contradictory imperatives. They
employ methods that cannot be openly acknowledged within the larger legal and social
framework in which they function. In this article, we illustrate this concept through an
interview-based study of Australia’s immigration detention network. This network enacts a
deterrence policy which has been widely condemned as breaching Australia’s obligations
under international law. At the same time, it is required to maintain a façade of lawfulness
and respect for human rights.
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Grey Networks: The Contradictory Dimensions of Australia’s Immigration Detention
System

‘The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the
gate. There he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he
wears the gatekeeper out with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him
briefly, questioning him about his homeland and many other things, but they are
indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always tells him once
more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has equipped himself with many
things for his journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the
gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I am taking this only so that
you do not think you have failed to do anything.”’
(Kafka, 1915: 5)

Introduction
‘Policy network analysis’ is an umbrella term for a large and fragmented literature,
beginning in the early 1980s. According to Rhodes, the term ‘policy network analysis’ has
been used in three main ways within this scholarship, ‘as a description of governments at
work, as a theory for analysing government policy making, and as a prescription for
reforming public management’ (Rhodes, 2008: 426). In these literatures, policy networks are
typically characterised as assemblages of nodes, linkages and relationships, both formal and
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informal, between governmental agencies and other organisations such as business groups,
interest groups and civil society associations (Rhodes, 2008: 426). In general, policy network
analysis has focused on collaborative networks which are ‘seen as appropriate devices to
tackle public management problems and to successfully coordinate political, social, and
economic action’ (Raab and Milward, 2003: 413).
We take as our starting point a problem delineated by Milward and Raab (2006); in a series
of papers, Raab and Milward have sought to develop an account of ‘dark networks’. This
research is concerned with networks as problems rather than networks as means of
addressing social needs. As the authors note, ‘one of the basic features of research on
networks, which repeatedly appears in almost all studies, is the statement that networks are
often the only governance form that is able to deal with today's complex problems’ (2003:
418). In exploring this function, however, this literature has tended to overlook what Raab
and Milward characterise as the ‘darker’ side of networks, primarily the role of networks in
organised crime and terrorism. They thus introduce a distinction between ‘dark’ and ‘bright’
networks, that is, between systems of illicit association that are characterised by their
secretive nature, and the more commonly studied legal networks that permeate all of
society.
Bright and dark networks are delineated along two axes: legal/illegal and overt/covert (Raab
and Milward, 2003: 413). The authors acknowledge that the distinction is not clear cut, and
that dark and bright networks can come together in a ‘grey zone’, for example in the
political arm of a terrorist organisation (such as Sinn Fein and the IRA) (Milward and Raab,
2006: 334). In this paper, we draw attention to a kind of network which cannot be
straightforwardly located on these axes and which thus highlights a limitation of this
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taxonomic framework. Essentially, our point is that the degree of legality or transparency of
a network is sometimes a contested question. For Milward and Raab, legality ‘refers to the
laws of the state, any state’ (Milward and Raab, 2006: 334). Legality, in their framework, is
relativised to a specified jurisdiction. For example, they describe networks organised by the
Third Reich as ‘bright’ because they were legal under that regime. However, networks often
operate across jurisdictions and in contested legal spaces where different sources of law
and legal authority come into conflict. Most importantly for this article – domestic law and
policy may come into conflict with a state’s obligations under international law.
Networks have been characterised as overt or covert based primarily on whether the nodes
in the network are readily visible, or whether the network is hidden and can only be
mapped with considerable investigative effort. However, it is possible for a network to be
transparent in one sense and opaque in another. The network that we are concerned with
in this paper is overt in that it is an instrument of government policy whose nodes and
connections are visible. Nonetheless, aspects of the operation and function of this network
are, by design, opaque. The term ‘grey networks’ in this paper is intended to describe
networks that appear to have ambiguous properties with respect to both lawfulness and
transparency.
What we are calling ‘grey networks’ are networks that have to manage internal
contradictions. They occupy a legal grey zone in that they may be legal under domestic law
but illegal under international law, or they may abrogate rights which are recognised
elsewhere in the legal system. Grey networks also have a Janus-faced character, in that they
present as operating within legal and social norms, according to fair procedures, while at
the same time enabling activities that must be officially disavowed. Grey networks may
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develop in contexts where an institutional framework is placed under discordant pressures
and where it is, for example, subject to political demands that are not straightforwardly
realisable within the overarching legal and social framework.
While we would argue that this phenomenon can be observed in a number of contexts, this
article is specifically concerned with Australia’s immigration detention network.i It is based
on an empirical study of the experiences of volunteer visitors to detention facilities. Raab
and Milward have pointed out that the concept of a ‘network’ is used in a variety of ways
within the social sciences literature (2003: 417). For the purposes of this discussion, the
detention network is understood as the web of individuals and organisations who make and
enact decisions affecting asylum seekers held in Australia’s immigration detention facilities.
As this article will demonstrate, such decisions concern not only the processing of the
asylum seekers’ refugee claims, but also the control and management of their daily lives.
The mandatory detention of unauthorised maritime arrivals has been a cornerstone of
Australia’s immigration policy since 1992 (Phillips and Spinks, 2013: 5). In its most recent
incarnation, this policy has seen asylum seekers detained and processed offshore on Manus
Island or Nauru, but a system of prison-like facilities continues to operate on the Australian
mainland. It is these facilities and their governance that are the focus of this paper. Unlike
the offshore facilities, Australia’s onshore detention facilities fall entirely under the
jurisdiction of Australian courts. The enactment of electorally-popular immigration policies
such as mandatory detention thus places contradictory pressures on the system. On one
hand, the network is answerable to the policy goal of deterring asylum seekers. On the
other hand, the pursuit of these goals threatens to violate long-established norms of due
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process, owed to any person on Australian soil, as well as breaching Australia’s obligations
under international law.
Australia’s processing of asylum claims has been notoriously slow, and both the on- and
offshore facilities have been plagued with cases of neglect, mistreatment and abuse. If it is
understood as a ‘bright’ or conventional network, much of what happens within Australia’s
detention system can only be attributed to mismanagement, inefficiency and/or structural
flaws. While we certainly would not deny that such failings exist, there is a useful
explanatory perspective that is not available under the bright network assumption. A more
satisfactory explanation of this apparent dysfunction needs to pay attention to the
discordant imperatives that this system is answerable to.
When fieldwork for this study was conducted, nine onshore immigration detention facilities
were operational in Australia. These facilities were Maribyrnong Immigration Detention
Centre (IDC),ii Villawood IDC, Christmas Island IDC, Yongah Hill IDC, Perth IDC, Brisbane
Immigration Transit Accommodation (ITA), Melbourne ITA, Adelaide ITA, and Wickham
Point Alternative Place of Detention (APOD)iii. The testimonial evidence in this paper derives
from in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, conducted in 2015 and 2016 with
32 visitors to these facilities. Collectively, the participants in this study were visitors at all of
the above detention facilities, with the exception of Adelaide ITA. Interviews were
conducted by Peterie as part of a larger study concerning the experiences of volunteers who
support asylum seekers in Australia. The testimonial nature of this dataset is important
because policy documentation and press releases conceal the lived reality of daily practice
within these facilities. These testimonies also reveal the extent to which opacity and
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confusion are operational principles that serve to make the system unnavigable for those
subject to its authority.
This paper begins with a discussion of the legal tensions that surround Australia’s treatment
of unauthorised maritime arrivals. It examines the extraordinary statutory measures that
have been taken to make policies legal under domestic law. The paper then turns to
consider the means by which the reality of Australia’s mandatory detention policy is made
simultaneously visible and deniable, and examines the discursive strategies that help to
make that possible. A deterrence policy requires violence, but that violence must also be
rendered legally and socially palatable. The final section of this paper examines the use of
‘soft violence’ within the system, arguing that control, arbitrariness and opacity can achieve
torture-like effects while maintaining a façade of humaneness. These ambiguities, we argue,
should not be understood as problems to be resolved. A grey network is not a dysfunctional
bright network. Rather, a grey network presents as a bright network, but performs functions
that would not be sustainable in a straightforwardly law-abiding and transparent system.

The Tension between Domestic and International Law
The onshore detention facilities exist to realise Australia’s policy of mandatory detention. As
indicated above, the system consists of ten facilities. The operation of these facilities has
been outsourced to a private contractor, SERCO, who manages the centres on behalf of the
Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
The United Nations has found that Australia’s policies of mandatory detention and offshore
processing violate its obligations under international law (20 August 2013a, 20 August
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2013b). The Australian Human Rights Commission has made a similar claim, particularly with
regard to children in detention (2014). In some countries, international laws are
automatically incorporated into the domestic legal system. In Australia, however, this is not
the case. International laws cannot be enforced by Australian courts unless these laws have
been incorporated into domestic laws. As such, policies that are consistent with Australian
law can withstand legal challenge, even when these laws constitute clear violations of
Australia’s international human rights obligations.
This feature of Australian law has been exploited in order to deny asylum seekers the legal
rights that Australia has committed to upholding. There are two mechanisms of particular
note here. First, offshore processing – a policy which sees asylum seekers processed outside
the jurisdiction of Australia’s courts – has been introduced. Second, successive governments
have passed laws which ensure that treaty obligations are not enforceable by Australian
courts. By stripping refugee protections from domestic law, the government has
circumscribed asylum seekers’ rights. Far from enshrining Australia’s commitment to abide
by The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘the Refugee Convention’), the
Australian government has removed all references to the Refugee Convention from the
Migration Act 1958 (McAdam, 3 December 2014).
Furthermore, the government has often legislated to bolster the legal standing of its policies
when challenges have been mounted (McAdam and Chong, 2014: 172-173). For example, in
June 2015 the government introduced emergency legislation which was allegedly designed
to head-off a challenge to the legality of Australia’s offshore detention system (Conifer and
Doran, 24 June 2015). Faced with questions about the timing of the Bill, Attorney-General
Brandis disingenuously claimed that the government was not acting to protect itself, and
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that Australia’s offshore processing arrangements had always been lawful. “The legal advice
to the Government and to the previous Labor government was that the scheme was within
the law" (Brandis in Conifer and Doran, 24 June 2015). More importantly, however, this
defence trades on a narrow and technical conception of lawfulness, which evades
disquestions about respect for human dignity and fundamental rights. It should also be
noted that despite legislative efforts to make Australia’s asylum policies lawful, issues of
domestic lawfulness remain. This was seen in 2017 when the government settled a
compensation claim for AU$70 million. The complainants – a group of current and former
detainees – had claimed damages for “consequences arising out of [their] transfer and
subsequent confinement […] at Manus Island” (Macaulay, 2017).
With respect to international law, Australia has repeatedly failed to meet its obligations as a
signatory to the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees. Human rights experts around the world have condemned Australia’s asylum
seeker policies as a violation of these treaties, as well as a breach of several other
international agreements. The Refugee Convention formally recognises that the very nature
of the refugee experience means that it is often impossible for forced migrants to secure
passports and visas as they flee persecution (Phillips, 2011: 2-3). The cornerstone of
Australia’s asylum seeker policy, however, is indefinite mandatory detention. This policy
sees all maritime asylum seekers who arrive in Australia without prior authorisation placed
in immigration detention until their asylum claims have been determined, or until the
Minister has granted them permission to reside in the community. This policy applies only to
‘illegal’ (unauthorised) arrivals; those who arrive with valid documentation and go on to
claim asylum are not subject to mandatory detention (Phillips and Spinks, 2013: 1-2).
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Australia’s detention policy has also been seen as a breach of article 9 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This article provides that ‘[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention’ (UN General Assembly, 1966). Australia’s
detention regime has been described as ‘arbitrary’. The Australian Human Rights
Commission acknowledges that short-term detention may be necessary in some
circumstances, but notes that ‘in order to avoid detention being arbitrary, there must be an
individual assessment of the necessity of detention for each person, taking into
consideration their individual circumstances’ (1 January 2014). The blanket and default
application of Australia’s detention policy renders it arbitrary.
In addition to these concerns, the conditions in which Australia holds asylum seekers have
been widely denounced (Phillips and Spinks, 2013). The United National Human Rights
Committee (20 August 2013a, 20 August 2013b) and the Australian Human Rights
Commission (2013) have both suggested that in some circumstances Australia’s detention
regime constitutes ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’, placing it in violation of article
10 of the ICCPR. At times centres have been overcrowded, and housing arrangements
(including the accommodation of asylum seekers with convicted criminals, or young children
with mentally ill adults) have raised concern. Australia’s offshore processing facilities have
received particular criticism. Refugees and whistle blowers have described horrific
conditions and endemic levels of physical and sexual violence (Nethery and Holman, 2016,
Hoang and Gleeson, 10 August 2016), including incidents involving children. Within the
Nauru Files (a cache of 2,116 leaked incident reports from Australia’s processing centre on
Nauru), there were seven reports of sexual assaults involving children, 59 reports of assault
on children and 30 reports of self-harm involving children (Farrell et al., 10 August 2016).
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For many, the most concerning aspect of Australia’s detention regime is the fact that
Australia’s mandatory detention policy also applies to minors. A 2014 Australian Human
Rights Commission Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention found that prolonged
detention had ‘[profound] negative impacts on the mental and emotional health and
development of children’, with 34 percent of detained children suffering from serious
mental health disorders (29). The Commission also expressed concern that children in
detention were regularly exposed to physical danger. The Commission was particularly
condemnatory regarding the detention of children in offshore facilities, where physical and
sexual violence are rife.iv The Convention on the Rights of the Child enshrines the
overarching legal principle that ‘in any actions concerning children, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration’ (McAdam and Chong, 2014: 101, see also Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, April 2004). The application of Australia’s
mandatory detention policy to children violates this principle.
It is clear from this chorus of indictment that Australia is pursuing a policy that breaches its
obligations under international law. Nevertheless, the legal manoeuvres outlined earlier
have rendered these laws domestically unenforceable. What is striking here is the effort to
maintain the appearance of respect for international law and human rights. Australia has
responded to these charges by insisting that its policies do comply with its legal obligations,
and claiming that the issue reduces to a question of difference in interpretation (see, for
example, Conifer and Doran, 24 June 2015). If the international lawfulness of Australia’s
detention practices was not in question, however, it would be difficult to explain the veil of
secrecy that covers the system. Staff at offshore processing centres have been required to
sign non-disclosure agreements, and journalists and human rights organisations are
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routinely denied access (Fleay, 2015, Nethery and Holman, 2016). Although the offshore
facilities are more isolated than the onshore network, there is significantly less formal
oversight within the onshore network than within Australia’s prison system (Briskman et al.,
2008: 343). Restrictions on media access and the obstacles faced by external visitors suggest
the intention to make these centres, as far as possible, closed institutions. Many scholars
have highlighted the centrality of secrecy and inaccessibility to Australia’s detention
strategy, noting that asylum seekers are often kept ‘out of sight, out of mind’. As Fleay
notes, ‘[t]here is limited independent monitoring of these facilities by formal state and nonstate bodies. There are also few civil society groups and individuals with the capacity to visit
and provide a monitoring role’ (2015: 22).

Discursive Manoeuvres
In the last two decades, Australia has seen the bipartisan endorsement of policies explicitly
intended to deter asylum seekers from seeking protection in Australia. These escalating
measures and the dehumanising discourses that have accompanied them respond to the
political reality that Australian politicians are rewarded at the polls for ‘tough’ asylum
policies. The 2001 election is often described as a turning point in Australia’s treatment of
asylum seekers (see, for example, Suhnan et al., 2012: 80). The conservative government –
led by Prime Minister John Howard – entered the campaign trailing in the polls but went on
to win a decisive victory. Howard exploited public fears regarding terrorism and ‘Islamic
extremism’ in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, and projected
these fears onto maritime asylum seekers (Poynting et al., 2004, Marr and Wilkinson, 2003,
Poynting and Noble, 2003, Devetak, 2007). Howard’s stance was cast as a display of national
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strength. This successful electoral strategy provided a template for subsequent
governments, and began what has been widely described as a ‘race to the bottom’ on the
treatment of boat arrivals. While public antipathy to asylum seekers has been identified as a
decisive electoral issue (McMaster, 2002: 280), it is manifestly clear that these policy
objectives are in tension with Australia’s self-understanding as a ‘generous’ country with an
exemplary record of respect for human rights.
Discourse analysts have drawn attention to a number of key narratives which have come to
structure Australia’s asylum seeker debate and justify the government’s policies. These
narratives include stories about the threat that asylum seekers pose to Australian values
(Gale, 2004, Gelber, 2003, Every and Augoustinos, 2007, Randell-Moon, 2006, Dunn et al.,
2007); to the maintenance of law, order and domestic security (McCulloch, 2004, Poynting
et al., 2004, Brookes, 2010); and to national resources (Columbus, 2002, Green, 2003).
While research confirms that these messages resonate with the electorate (McKay et al.,
2011), Australians have also expressed concern regarding the human costs of deterrence. As
such, governments have increasingly employed humanitarian language to frame their
policies, suggesting that hardline deterrence policies are ‘compassionate’ (in that they
purportedly save lives at sea and curb people-smuggling) and ‘fair’ (in that they ensure
maritime asylum seekers derive no advantage from ‘jumping the queue’) (Peterie 2017; see
also Dauvernge, 2015). These discursive strategies present deterrence policies as
compatible with Australia’s self-image as a decent and law-abiding country.
In reality, however, the realisation of these policies involves attempting to repel people who
are already at the limit of human desperation. As a consequence, deterrence necessarily
requires harsh and draconian measures. The political effectiveness of deterrence thus
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depends on an acute form of bad faith in the popular discourse. While this tension can be
sidestepped at the level of campaign slogans, its practical consequences impose
contradictory demands on the detention network itself. The issue here is that the detention
system is required to function as an instrument of deterrence. It has to be seen by both the
voting public and the would-be asylum seeker as harsh and punitive. At the same time,
however, asylum seekers in Australia’s onshore system are rights-bearers who have
committed no crime and whose treatment is governed by legal norms. Notwithstanding the
legislative erosion of rights for onshore asylum seekers, those who are processed within the
onshore system have different prospects to those who have been sent offshore.

Soft Violence
To negotiate the contradiction between Australia’s deterrence policy and its international
obligations, the legal and discursive strategies described above require the supplement of
an additional set of techniques at the institutional level. These techniques are applied to
detainees whose legal claims are already in process within the onshore network, for the
purpose of realising Australia’s deterrence policy while retaining the appearance of due
process. We refer to these techniques collectively as ‘soft violence’. ‘Soft’ here does not
mean gentle. Rather it refers to a means of breaking people which operates at a
psychological level. Since the 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo, 2007), it has been
understood that people can be psychologically broken through techniques of
dehumanisation and disempowerment. Scholars have drawn attention to the centrality of
‘deprivations’ and ‘frustrations’ to the incarceration experience, noting that these systems
of institutional disempowerment in fact constitute a ‘threat to the life goals of the
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individual, to his defensive system, to his self-esteem, or to his feelings of security’ (Maslow
in Skyes, 1958). For scholars in this tradition the psychological pain of institutionalisation
and incarceration is best understood as non-accidental (Goffman, 1961, Brookes, 2001,
Pizarro and Stenius, 2004, DeVeaux, 2013, Foucault, 1995 [1975]). The accounts presented
in the interviews on which this article draws point to three main operational principles –
control, arbitrariness and opacity – that can be interpreted as modes of soft violence. These
principles, we argue, should also be seen as non-accidental.
Soft violence is a means by which the detention system fulfils its contradictory imperatives.
It perpetrates an effective deterrent violence in a manner which maintains at least a
superficial respect for law, due-process and human rights norms. Opacity is a strategy
deployed both outside and within the system. On one hand, the network hides abuses from
public view. On the other, opacity renders even the ordinary details of daily live
unpredictable. This lack of transparency is a powerful means for breaking people without
appearing to break the law.

Control
The onshore network is an all-encompassing system. Control is exercised over not just the
physical movements of asylum seekers in time and space, but also over the smallest choices
of everyday life. It is significant, given the detainees are not criminals, that the forms of
control that we see in detention go far beyond that which is necessary to fulfil their
custodial function.
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The most obvious form of control that asylum seekers are subjected to is restrictions on
their movements. What detention means, in practice, is that almost all aspects of an asylum
seeker’s life take place within the closed confines of a detention facility. As one interviewee
explained,
‘These people that you visited last week, they have not moved. They've gone to their
room to the community area to maybe the sporting oval to the community area back
to their room to the internet area but they haven't moved outside a space of 100
square metres of whatever it is’.
Within the facilities themselves, asylum seekers’ movements are also restricted. One
interviewee noted that the asylum seekers were not permitted to use the same bathroom
as their visitors. Another described being rebuked when she tried to take a child to look at
the garden.
‘I actually tried to take one of the little kids in there to walk around and have a look
at the flowers, and one of the guards said 'you're not allowed in there' […] I suppose
I just thought why do we deprive people of something so basic as having your toes in
the grass and bending down and picking a petunia and looking at the colours on it?
And feeling, you know, touching stuff? Whereas back in there all that they could
touch were hard things – like the climbing frame and the slippery slide’.
When asylum seekers are permitted to leave detention facilities – for example, when they
need medical attention – they are accompanied by security personnel and sometimes
handcuffed. One interviewee noted that his friend had refused to wear handcuffs during a
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trip to the doctor because he did not wish to be perceived as a criminal. The medical
appointment was subsequently cancelled.
Interviewees also noted that institutional life saw asylum seekers denied agency over the
most basic areas of their lives. This reality was particularly pronounced for asylum seekers
who had children. As one interviewee reflected, detained parents could not choose where
their children lived or went to school. They could not buy their clothes, attend their parentteacher interviews, or decide what they ate.
‘All those things that you take for granted when you've got freedom are not there for
those parents. That their lives are – their everyday life is dictated. Choosing what
their kids can take to school for lunch. They sound like really silly things but they're
the things that you can control as a parent and those mums and dads can't do that.’
Being unable to fulfil a parent’s responsibilities towards their children – through, for
example, the provision of food and clothing – effects an ongoing humiliation and
infantilisation. When combined with the negative impacts of detention-related mental
health deterioration on parenting and parent-child bonding, these harms are compounded.
The psychological effect of denying asylum seekers even the most mundane acts of choice
and decision undermines their sense of agency. The erosion of agential capacities leads to
what is termed, in the psychological literature, ‘learned helplessness’.
‘Learned helplessness, the failure to escape shock induced by uncontrollable
aversive events, was discovered half a century ago. Seligman and Maier (1967)
theorized that animals learned that outcomes were independent of their
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responses—that nothing they did mattered—and that this learning undermined
trying to escape’. (Maier and Seligman, 2016: 349)
While contemporary neuroscientific research suggests that the theory of learned
helplessness ‘got it backward’ – that is, that passivity is not learned but ‘the default,
unlearned response to prolonged aversive events’ (Maier and Seligman, 2016: 349) –
Seligman and Maier’s core insight regarding the relationships between prolonged and
uncontrollable negative stimulation and helplessness has endured. Behavioural research has
repeatedly demonstrated that when individuals are simultaneously exposed to stressors and
denied control over their circumstances, passivity and anxiety will result. This effect can be
prevented by giving individuals control (Maier and Seligman, 2016: 361).
The message continuously reiterated and reinforced by techniques of control in immigration
detention facilities is that the detainee is powerless. If a person cannot exercise choice in
inconsequential matters, then a fortiori they lack agency with respect to their asylum claim.
The point of control mechanisms that penetrate down to minute details of daily life is to
manufacture passivity and despair. Whether this response is learned or innate, it is
nonetheless a predictable result of this technology of control.
We argued above that a grey network is a network that is subject to internal contradictions.
We noted that grey networks present as operating within legal and social norms, but pursue
outcomes that must be officially disavowed. The rules and prohibitions described here are a
powerful technique that disempower detainees, producing psychological distress without
having to make that intention explicit.
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Arbitrariness
Arbitrariness functions to assert a radical asymmetry of power. Arbitrariness here refers to
the permanent possibility of a decision that is both sudden and incontestable. Shifting and
unpredictable prohibitions and reinterpretations of rules demonstrate to the asylum
seekers the extent of their powerlessness. A recurring theme in the interviews concerned
arbitrariness in the small details of institutional life, for example, in the management of
leisure activities. One interviewee described her confusion when, during her first visit to a
detention facility, she saw Muslim adult asylum seekers colouring in what she described as
‘pre-school level’ pictures of Easter bunnies and Easter eggs.
‘I couldn't understand – why are they doing it? Why are they cooperating? I just said
to [one asylum seeker], 'do you like colouring in?' you know. And she said 'no'. And I
said 'oh, why are you doing it then?' And then she explained that it was for the
points that they get […] So they do an activity for half an hour they get two points. So
with three or six points they can buy some shampoo or nicer soap or whatever,
chocolate. So that's why they do it, to get the points. […] I just thought 'this is really
demeaning. This is really demeaning. These grown adult people doing anything just
to get a few points.’
Several weeks later, with no notice or explanation, all colouring in at the centre was banned.
Another interviewee explained that his asylum seeker friend had derived great joy from
occasional trips out of detention to visit the beach. During these supervised excursions, the
asylum seeker would chat with the locals and enjoy a few moments of ‘normality’ in the
open air. Without notice or explanation, these trips were cancelled. As one interviewee
noted,
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‘I don't know if it is necessarily the government or SERCO doing it to create
hopelessness, but they certainly don't do anything to give sense of reason. […]
People start to create their own reasons as to why it's happening, and it happens a
lot. And that's the first conclusion they'll jump to, that they're doing it to
disadvantage them or to damage them. To make them not feel good.’
Interviewees thus reported that detainees interpret the system’s capriciousness as a
deliberate cruelty.
Within Australia’s detention regime, arbitrariness is discernible in the small details of
institutional life, but it is perhaps communicated most dramatically in forced relocations. It
is common for asylum seekers to be moved from one detention facility to another. Often
asylum seekers are moved to other facilities within the onshore network; for those who had
previously been transferred from offshore to onshore detention (usually for medical
attention), these relocations may also involve being transferred to Manus Island or Nauru.
When a detainee is moved from one centre to another this removal typically happens with
little warning or explanation, often at night. Other asylum seekers see their friends dragged
away but may not be told where they are being taken or why. These scenes constantly
remind detainees of the Damoclean sword under which they live.
Another form of arbitrariness, crucial to this dispiriting effect, is arbitrariness with respect to
time. Here the network produces a kind of stasis in which a case is in process but the asylum
seeker is given no timeline for when a decision will be reached. One asylum seeker told her
visitor, ‘every day we see our case manager, and every day they tell us ‘not today’, and we
don't know more’; another described her elderly mother telling her ‘we’re going to die
here’. In January 2017, the average number of days that detainees spent in Australia’s
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onshore detention facilities was 493, a number that has been steadily rising since 2013
(RCOA, 1 March 2017). A 2016 report by the Commonwealth Ombudsman also noted that
42 people had been in detention for five years or more, with no foreseeable possibility of
release (Commonwealth and Immigration Ombudsman, July 2016).
Unlike a prisoner serving a fixed sentence, the detainee is unable to make any plans for a
future that may not eventuate. What is particularly cruel about this situation is that even
the ordinary strategies by which people maintain hope are rendered untenable. As one
interviewee, a youth worker, explained, youth work usually involves working with young
people to ‘build hopes and dreams’. Within detention environments, however, any
aspirations are purely hypothetical. The young asylum seekers that this interviewee visited
were thus unable to build, commit to or sustain themselves with any real goals because
their futures were so uncertain.
We argue that this regime of unstable rules and arbitrary practices should be understood
primarily in terms of its psychological function, which is to amplify the sense of helplessness
that the detainees experience. The individual actions required by this technique of ‘a
thousand cuts’ can be represented as largely innocuous, insulating individual actors from
moral and legal responsibility for the aggregate effects achieved by the network as a whole.

Opacity
A third theme in these testimonies concerns the opaque way in which power is exercised
within the detention facilities. Interviewees emphasised the complex nature of the
bureaucratic processes that the asylum seekers were required to go through, noting that
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many detainees had minimal understanding of the legal and administrative mechanisms
that governed their detention. One interviewee recalled asking the asylum seeker he visited,
whose protection claim had just been rejected for the third time, ‘do they ever tell you why
you’re rejected?’ The man answered, ‘oh, they give me a bit of paper. I don’t understand it.’
Another described lodging freedom of information requests so that the detainees she
visited would have access to their own files. While several interviewees emphasised that
language barriers made these processes particularly opaque for asylum seekers, others
suggested that even legal experts found the system confounding.
‘I was sitting in a court case […] where judges who were experts on administration
but not on immigration were trying to get their head around how this whole thing
worked and why the delays […] And at one stage the presiding judge said “I think I’m
in Alice in Wonderland”. And we all just laughed.’
In a bright network, opacity is regarded as problematic. It can be a cause of inefficiency and
dysfunction. Ideally, the hierarchical organisation and lines of responsibility are transparent,
such that sites of decision and the nodes subject to those decisions are visible in the
network structure. By contrast, in dark networks opacity can be functional. For example, the
cellular structure of a criminal or terrorist organisation means that when members of one
cell are captured, their lack of knowledge regarding other cells protects the larger network
from attack. In grey networks, such as the detention network described here, opacity is also
functional, but in a different way. Opacity here means the obfuscation of procedures and
decisional hierarchies in ways that make it difficult to act. It serves to paralyse by rendering
the operations of the network uninterpretable and non-negotiable to both detainees and
those who would help them. The problem of making a request or complaint, or of even
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accessing information about one’s own asylum claim, is multiplied by the difficulty of finding
out how to do these things.
Opacity also enables plausible deniability in that a policy can be implemented without being
officially acknowledged. In this context, the outsourcing of operations is a method of
increasing opacity in the network. As noted, the running of all detention centres in Australia
has been contracted to a private company. This enables the classification of operational
information as ‘commercial in confidence’. Similarly, employees of a private contractor can
be more easily made subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements. Outsourcing
creates another layer of separation between government and the daily operation of
detention facilities. When detainees suffer serious harm in detention facilities, blame can be
diverted away from the government to the contractor and its employees. Furthermore, as
McPhail, Ochoki Nyamori and Taylor have pointed out, ‘head contractors are allowed to
sub-contract out the work, which creates huge gaps in accountability. It is unclear who will
be held accountable in the event that one of the subcontractors fails to discharge their part
of the contractual obligations’ (2016, 962).
This opacity also functions to protect the network from challenges and to make it difficult
for detainees or their representatives to assert their rights. Within detention centres,
decisions are often delivered without explanation or attribution to an authority. It is unclear
which rules originate with site personnel and which demands devolve from higher levels of
management, either within SERCO or in the government. Protests, complaints and requests
for reconsideration are short circuited by the difficulty of even knowing where to address an
effective challenge. Those who execute decisions are also able to represent themselves as

24 of 31

‘just following orders’ and as having no more understanding of the justification of these
orders as those subject to them.

Conclusion
Australia imagines itself to be a liberal democracy and a good international citizen, with
stable institutions enshrining principles of fairness and equality. In the last two decades,
both of Australia’s major political parties have promised to stem the flow of unauthorised
boat arrivals requesting asylum. The realisation of these policies cannot be and has not been
achieved without inflicting damage on the rule of law and Australia’s international standing.
The implementation of Australia’s deterrence policies requires, in practice, the deployment
of techniques calculated to produce helplessness and desperation, and thus to break
people. This institutionalised cruelty must be visible to the public who voted to ‘stop the
boats’. At the same time, however, these measures and procedures must be undertaken in
such a way as to maintain a façade of lawfulness and respect for human rights.
What we have called a grey network is a network that is subject to contradictions of this
type. Grey networks implement methods that cannot be fully or officially acknowledged
within the legal and institutional structure in which they operate. Imprisonment, oppressive
controls, arbitrariness, endless delay, and the dangerous hothouse effects of closed
institutions are not techniques that can be openly acknowledged. As MacBeth, in bad faith,
wills the hand to do what the eye fears, so too does Australia’s detention network allow
Australia to disavow the cruelty that its asylum policies demand.
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One contribution of this article, we hope, is to demonstrate the limitation of the dark/bright
network taxonomy by demonstrating that networks can occupy ambiguous and contested
spaces with respect to both legality and transparency. The distinction between bright and
dark networks connects brightness with legality and darkness with illegality. A grey network,
in our metaphor, is one subject to contradictory imperatives. A grey network is a network
that occupies, and to an extent creates, a zone of legal ambiguity. It enables policies that are
at odds with other legal obligations and institutional norms. At the level of representation,
the grey network maintains the possibility of paying lip service to legal principles and ideals
while simultaneously skirting these constraints. At the level of operations, it both realises
and conceals the means necessary to achieve its policy goals. The grey network
manufactures a zone of inaccessibility. It aims to place its subjects’ rights beyond their own
reach.
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i

Not all detainees in Australian detention facilities are asylum seekers, and not all asylum seekers are in closed
detention. The primary focus of this article, however, is the detention of asylum seekers.
ii
Closure of this facility is immanent.
iii
This facility was closed in November 2016.
iv
‘The Commission has serious concerns that the conditions in which children are detained on Nauru are in
breach of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, articles 19(1), 20(1), 24(1), 27(1), 27(3), 28, 31 and:
16(1): No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.
34: States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse.
37(a): No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
committed by persons below eighteen years of age’ (AHRC, 2014).
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